One-Tel was a major corporate collapse in Australia in 2001. At the time of its collapse, it was the fourth largest telecommunications company in Australia with more than two million customers and operations in eight countries. Analyses of quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources suggest that One-Tel's collapse is a classic case of failed expectations, strategic mistakes, wrong pricing policy, and unbridled growth. The company's meteoric rise and fall was associated with serious deficiencies in its corporate governance including weaknesses in internal control, financial reporting, audit quality, board's scrutiny of management, management communication with the board, and poor executive pay-toperformance link. Thus, the collapse of One-Tel has several important lessons on the role of corporate governance in preventing corporate collapse.
of corporate collapse, then analysis of governance structure and practice of collapsed firms is in order.
To draw lessons from the One-Tel collapse, this paper first provides a brief history of the company (section 2). Understanding its business history in terms of the business model, strategies and growth is important for identifying the antecedents to its collapse. Then, to document its financial distress and subsequent collapse, One-Tel's financial performance is analysed (section 3). Thereafter, governance practice at One-Tel is analysed for linking its collapse with corporate governance (section 4). Finally, summary and conclusions of the paper are provided (section 5).
In terms of design, it is an embedded, single-case study (Creswell 2007 , Yin 2003 .
Both archival quantitative and qualitative data were analysed. Analysis of archival data mitigates observer-caused effects and observer bias (McKinnon 1988) . To ensure the reliability of data sources (McKinnon 1988) , qualitative data were collected from diverse sources such as company annual reports, legal judgment, newspaper articles, and published electronic media contents. Further, as data were collected from diverse sources, the study achieves some level of data triangulation (Creswell 2007 , Stake 1995 . Qualitative data were analysed and interpreted using textual analysis method (Bryman and Bell 2007, Tregidga and Milne 2006) and by following an iterative process as suggested by Mäkelä and Näsi (2009) 
The quantitative analysis was longitudinal in nature. It involved analysis of One-Tel's audited financial statements for the fiscal years 1996-97 to 1999-2000 as well as a comparison of One-Tel's performance against its competitors. The next section provides a brief history of the One-Tel collapse.
The One-Tel Collapse
One-Tel was launched on 1 May 1995. Under an agreement with Optus which was the second largest telecommunications company in Australia, One-Tel received SIM cards, customer call details, and network service from Optus. One-Tel had to pay Optus for the call charges and a monthly access fee for each of its subscribers. Thus, One-Tel's gross profit was the excess of the amount billed to its customers over the amount paid to Optus. The company hoped to attract customers by offering cheap mobile calling rates, and selling profitable, long distance and international call service to them.
The company grew very rapidly in its early years. Its customer base increased from only 1 000 on 30 June 1995 to 100 000 by 28 September 1996 to 160 000 by 30 June 1997.
Its sales revenue was A$148 million in 1996-97 with an operating profit after tax of A$3.7 million. However, disputes developed between Optus and One-Tel since July 1996 on two issues: (1) Optus was directly competing with One-Tel for subscribers; and (2) One-Tel launched it local call product in late 1999, charging subscribers at a rate of Australian 17.5 cents as part of a bundled product that included fixed to mobile calls, national and international calls. While the local calls would operate at a loss, the expectation was that the relatively high margins on the other bundled products would counter that loss and allow (Owen, 2001 ). In the next section, One-Tel's financial performance is analysed.
Financial Performance
The 1998 in 1996-97, 40% in 1997-98, 57% in 1998-99 and 100% in 1999-2000 . However, the phenomenal revenue growths did not translate into higher profitability. One-Tel's profit margins (operating profit after tax divided by sales revenue) appeared to be 3% in 1996-97, 3% in 1997-98, 2% in 1998-99 and -45% in 1999-2000 . Similarly, its returns on assets (operating profit after tax scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year) were 12% in 1997-98, 9% in 1998-99 and -55% in 1999-2000 . 
TAKE IN FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
To explore whether its financial performance represented the state of the telecommunications industry in Australia during the late 1990s, Table 3 
TAKE IN TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Corporate Governance
To examine the role of One-Tel's corporate governance in its collapse, one needs to define corporate governance and the standards of measuring the quality of governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) O 'Shea (2005) observes that good governance has six universally accepted practices, implicitly or explicitly: (1) When the standards of good governance are applied to One-Tel, it would appear that many of its practices did not comply with good governance. More importantly, governance failure exacerbated the conditions in which One-Tel collapsed. The next three sub-sections focus on three aspects of One-Tel's corporate governance: financial reporting quality, board composition and activity, and executive compensation.
Financial reporting quality
Financial reporting quality is high when financial reports faithfully represent the underlying economic phenomena. Faithful representation requires financial information to be complete, neutral (i.e., unbiased presentation of both good and bad news) and free from error (Statement of Financial Concepts No. 8, FASB, 2010) . This broad definition encompasses earnings quality. Higher earnings quality faithfully represents the features of the firm's fundamental earnings process (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010 There are several reasons to believe that One-Tel's earnings were of low quality.
First, One-Tel had higher accrual component in its earnings relative to that of its competitors with similar size. EBIDTA is used mainly by companies that report lower than expected earnings and start-up companies that are operating at a loss (King 2001) . Its usefulness as a non-GAAP performance metric is questionable (Francis et al. 2003 , Jennings 2003 .
It would appear that the audit quality for One.Tel was low. Following Carey and Simnett (2006) , audit quality in this paper is defined on two dimensions:(1) the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion, and (2) The evidence presented here suggests that One-Tel's reported earnings did not faithfully represent its fundamental earnings process. Its financial reporting quality including earning quality was low. It is no surprise that audit quality in One.Tel was low as well, given that financial reporting quality is endogenously related to audit quality. Low financial reporting quality and low audit quality concealed One-Tel's real financial performance and financial distress from its board and the shareholders. This in turn blocked any opportunity for remedial actions to avoid corporate collapse. The above discussion leads to the following 
Board composition and activity
Analysis of the 1998 Annual Report suggests, One-Tel had four members in the board that In One.Tel, the board chair did not always preside over board meetings. In 1997-98, one of the CEOs was appointed as chair for one of the eight meetings held in the year. In 1998-99, the board chair attended seven of the 10 meetings held but presided over only four.
Of the remaining six meetings, four were presided by Jodee Rich, one presided by Brad In summary, board composition and board activities in One.Tel suggest the following:
(1) one of the joint-CEOs had excessive influence on the board; (2) board members received selective and incomplete information on crucial aspects of the business; (3) there was a lack of diversity of opinions in the board to scrutinise management; (4) responsibilities were not clearly defined between the board and the management; and (5) the non-executive directors were virtually ineffective in providing a check and balance in the board. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
Ceteris paribus, firms with weaker management scrutiny than others are more likely to collapse.
H 5 : Ceteris paribus, firms with poorer management communication to the board than others are more likely to collapse.
Compensation
Remunerating executives fairly and responsibly is part of good corporate governance practice Thus, it appears that One-Tel was heavily engaged in granting options to its directors on very easy terms and conditions. In summary, the link between senior management compensation and One-Tel's performance appeared to be very weak.
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H 6 : Ceteris paribus, firms with weaker executive pay-to-performance link than others are more likely to collapse.
Summary and conclusion
This is a case study on the collapse of One-Tel, the fourth largest telecommunications The One-Tel collapse is a classic case of failed expectations, strategic mistakes, wrong pricing policy and unbridled growth. Clarke et al. (2003: 263) likened the collapse of One-Tel to 'still-born' corporate trajectory. Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) It paid dearly to acquire telecommunication licences to position itself in the market.
Nevertheless, the dream of building the leading phone company in Australia and the backing of the two Australian media magnates created high hopes in One-Tel investors, which led to 'market madness', but those high hopes were never realised. One.Tel had poor financial reporting quality including poor earnings quality. It was able to report small positive earnings in its early years due to non-conservative accounting policy choices and large positive accruals. It had weak internal controls and discrepancies in record keeping.
Its audit quality was poor as well. It consistently received an unqualified audit opinion despite serious breaches of the Corporations Act, accounting standards and auditing standards in 1998. Despite One-Tel's worsening operating cash deficits, cash collection problems and losses concealed by non-conservative accounting policies, its auditor failed to issue any going concern opinion. One-Tel management was able to paint a 'rosy' picture of the firm due to weak corporate governance. There was a lack of diversity of opinions in the board. The management did not make full disclosure to the board about the performance and solvency of the firm. On the other hand, the non-executive directors failed to scrutinise management effectively and ask 'awkward' questions to the management on how they operated the business. The link between executive pay and performance was weak in One.Tel. The management received larger performance bonuses in times of worsening firm performance.
One-Tel had troubles with its cash balance, creditors, earnings, and debtors.
However, management communications to the board always highlighted only EBITDA and gross margin, but not net profit. Further, the board was rarely apprised of aging creditors and aging debtor problems. Its cash balances reported in the board papers in most cases omitted unpresented cheques. There were no clearly defined responsibilities between the board and the management. One of the two joint-CEOs was very dominant in the board; this CEO never had to face an election subsequent to the first appointment and chaired several board meetings despite the presence of the board chair in those meetings. Although One-Tel had formed an audit committee, a remuneration committee, and even a corporate governance committee -all these committee roles were fulfilled by the same two non-executive directors.
These committees appear to have had no impact on One-Tel's governance. CEO dominance and poor monitoring of the management by the board stifled any chance for One-Tel's survival by blocking opportunities for board and leadership renewal.
Further, CEO dominance, and major shareholders' excessive reliance on the CEOs for information allowed the CEOs to hide the true picture of the firm. All these factors together aggravated One-Tel's crisis and led to its collapse.
One-Tel's collapse leaves several lessons on corporate strategies. First, it is not enough to acquire customers in large scale unless those customers contribute toward the profitability of the firm. Second, highly competitive pricing only to gain market share can have disastrous consequences. Third, it is not enough to generate sales revenues unless those revenues are collected in cash in a timely fashion.
One-Tel's demise leaves several important lessons on corporate governance as well.
First, strong internal controls, financial reporting quality, audit quality, effective management scrutiny, full disclosure of company affairs to the board, and a strong link between executive pay and firm performance are vital for effective corporate governance of a firm. Second, a board is less likely to detect firm problems when there is a dominant CEO in the firm. Third, non-executive board members should make their own enquiries into firm strategies and performance. Hence, non-executive members should be given access to middle and lower management to ensure transparency of information. Third, large investors in any firm must take an active interest in managing the firm. Fourth, as already documented in the literature, auditor's involvement in the non-audit service may compromise audit quality.
Fifth, the board chair should always preside over the board meetings to control the board's agenda and to effectively monitor management behaviour.
This case study provides some new insights into the association between corporate collapse and corporate governance. In particular, all else being equal, firms with weaker corporate governance than others are more likely to collapse, and the demand for good governance heightens in the wake of poor firm performance. Thus, good corporate governance has the role of a 'safety net' against corporate collapse. 
